University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2009

Shortcuts to Reform
Heather K. Gerken

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gerken, Heather K., "Shortcuts to Reform" (2009). Minnesota Law Review. 554.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/554

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Shortcuts to Reform
Heather K. Gerken†
This Article is loosely organized around the idea that
shortcuts can play a useful role in promoting election reform.
Shortcuts are a well known phenomenon in elections scholarship.1 The best known example is the party label, which provides voters an important heuristic for casting their vote. This
Article focuses on what shortcuts can do to promote reform. It
explains that shortcuts can and do play an important role in influencing three of the main leverage points for reform: voters,
policymakers, and bureaucrats. The Article also proposes we
create one such shortcut—a Democracy Index, which would
rank states and localities based on how well their election systems perform—and explains why it ought to help create an environment more receptive to reform. Along the way, the Article
offers some general observations about the challenges posed by
election reform and how to solve them.
Part I identifies what ought to be the central concern for
those interested in election reform: we operate in a reform environment where change rarely takes root. Part II examines
this problem in the context of election administration. It argues
that partisanship and localism generate political tides that run
against reform; it then proposes a Democracy Index as a potential solution. Part III argues that by providing a useful shortcut
for the three main constituencies for reform—voters, policymakers, and bureaucrats—an Index could help create an environment in which bigger, better reform is possible. Part IV
† J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to the
participants in the symposium for helpful comments and to the many people
who read and commented on my book, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System is Failing and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press, 2009),
where these and other issues are explored in greater depth and nuance. Portions of this essay are drawn from that book. Copyright © 2009 by Heather K.
Gerken.
1. See sources cited infra notes 14–15.
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briefly canvasses the costs associated with such a solution and
weighs them against the potential benefits. The Article concludes by offering examples of additional shortcuts that might
help jumpstart reform in other election arenas.
I. THE “HERE TO THERE” QUESTION
AND WHY IT MATTERS
Scholars are quite aware of how hard it is to get election
reform passed in the United States. I call it the “here to there”
problem. We have a firm sense of what is wrong with our election system (the “here”) and how to fix it (the “there”). But getting from “here to there” has been remarkably difficult in the
elections context. Reformers are fighting for change on difficult
terrain, and scholars have spent too little time thinking about
how to change the terrain itself. The vast majority of our scholarship has been devoted to the journey’s end, with precious little devoted to figuring out how to smooth the path that leads
there.2
This is surprising. After all, most arguments for election
reform depend on a single premise: process shapes substance.
Academics are quick to claim that the structure of our political
process (campaign finance law, redistricting rules) helps determine the substance of our policies (who gets elected, what
gets passed). But they do not apply that lesson to election
reform. The structure of our political process also determines
what kind of election reform gets passed. Or, in the case of the
United States, it creates an environment where precious little
gets passed.

2. There are, however, several exceptions to this general trend. See, e.g.,
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005);
Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184
(2007) [hereinafter Gerken, Double-Edged Sword]; Heather K. Gerken, A
Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 708 (2006); Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667
(2006); Heather K. Gerken, Citizens Must Drive Electoral Reform, ROLL CALL,
Nov. 15, 2005 [hereinafter Gerken, Electoral Reform]; Posting of Christopher
Elmendorf & Heather Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2005/11/next-time-start-with-people.html (Nov. 10, 2005, 23:40 EST); Daniel
P. Tokaji, The Moneyball Approach to Election Reform, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ,
Oct. 18, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/051018
.php.
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If the work of reformers is to be something other than a Sisyphean task, process should be an important scholarly focus.
“Here to there” proposals may seem modest when compared to
typical reform proposals, like calls for public financing or nonpartisan election administration. But these wide-ranging
reform proposals have been met with a deafening silence. We
have plenty of ideas about what kind of change we want. What
we need is an environment in which change can happen.
II. THE PROBLEM OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Let me give you an example of a “here to there” problem
and a promising shortcut for moving toward a solution. The
problem is our badly run election system. The best evidence we
have suggests that our election system is clunky at best and
dysfunctional at worst. Most experts agree that the system we
use to run our elections is chronically underfunded, often poorly
run, and sometimes administered in a partisan fashion.3 The
problem is that we do not have a very good way to reverse the
political tides that now run against reform. The solution I propose—a Democracy Index—should help do just that.
A. WHY ELECTION REFORM RARELY GETS TRACTION
At first glance, it seems like it ought to be easy to reform
our election system. After all, the basic ingredients for change
exist. There is a fairly robust consensus that we have a problem. Improving how our democracy works is an intuitively popular cause. And there have been semi-regular crises (most notably, Bush v. Gore4) to place the issue on the agenda.
The problem, as I explore in greater detail in Part III, is
that partisanship and localism generate political tides that run
against change. Unlike most developed democracies, state and
local officials run our elections, leading to what one scholar has
termed “hyper-decentralization.”5 Because election problems
3. For ease of exposition, throughout this Article I will often use terms
like “election system” to refer to our system of election administration—the
“nuts-and-bolts” activities of running an election (registration, balloting, vote
counting). The phrase usually refers to a far broader set of rules and institutional arrangements, including those surrounding districting and campaign
finance.
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election Administration, 6
ELECTION L.J. 118, 121 (2007) (reviewing ROY G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND
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are largely invisible to voters, the pressure of local competition
pushes states to invest in things that voters can see—schools,
roads, more cops on the beat—while neglecting the problems in
our election system. Moreover, many of the local officials who
run our elections have strong partisan ties. While bias is the
most disturbing consequence of partisanship, it is not the most
common. Perhaps the most unfortunate byproduct of partisanship is a lack of professionalism. A system that depends on the
political parties to staff it is unlikely to be staffed with trained
experts.
This unusual combination of partisanship and localism not
only results in a poorly run system, but makes change hard to
come by. At worst, election officials administer elections in a
partisan or unprofessional fashion. At best, they have few incentives to invest in the system and lots of reasons to resist
change. These factors combine to stymie change.
1. Partisanship
For instance, the obvious solution to the problem of partisanship is to replace politicians with bureaucrats whose jobs do
not depend on their political standing. But when foxes are
guarding the henhouse, it is hard to jettison them from that
powerful station. The people who decide who decides—the federal and state legislators with the power to place our election
system in the hands of nonpartisans—are partisans themselves. The party in control has little incentive to abandon this
important weapon in its political arsenal. It is not a coincidence
that election reform proposals tend to come from the party out
of power, which loses interest in reform the moment it gains a
majority of seats.
2. Localism
As with partisanship, localism does not just undermine the
quality of our system; it makes it hard to put a better one in
place. When partisanship blocks change, it is because politics is
working badly; representatives are putting their own interests
ahead of their constituents’. But even when politics is working
correctly—when politicians are attentive to what voters want—
political incentives run the wrong way in election reform. That
is because problems in our election system are mostly invisible
POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (2006)).
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to voters. While the problems we saw in Florida in 2000 and
Ohio in 2004—long lines, poor balloting machines, problems
with registration, discarded ballots—occur all too often, voters
become aware of them only when an election is so close that
these mishaps affect the outcome. Because these crises occur
episodically, voters have a haphazard sense of how well our
elections are run and no comparative data to tell them which
systems work and which do not.
In a decentralized system like our own, the invisibility of
election problems reduces the incentives for even reformminded politicians to invest in the system. One reason to favor
decentralization is that states and localities will compete to win
the hearts and minds of citizens, leading them to try to outdo
each other in providing useful services and passing good policies. But states and localities will compete only along the dimensions that voters can see. When election problems are invisible, localities will invest in projects that voters can readily
observe—new schools, roads, and more cops on the beat. In this
respect, our failure to maintain our election infrastructure parallels our failure to maintain our physical infrastructure. Both
occur because voters see only the occasional and haphazardly
distributed results of neglect but have no means to gauge how
things are working generally.
3. Voters’ and reformers’ lack of information
Unfortunately, voters and reformers have been unable to
alter this perverse political dynamic. Without comparative data
on how election systems work, voters have only a haphazard
sense of how well elections are run. We do not even know how
many people cast a ballot during our last presidential election,6
let alone how well our election system is performing. Voters
learn that there is a problem only when an election is so close
that the outcome is in doubt. That is like measuring annual
rainfall by counting how often lightening strikes.
Reformers similarly struggle in today’s political environment. Even when lightening strikes—when there is a crisis
that could energize a coalition for change—debates about
reform quickly descend into highly technical arguments about
6. Twenty percent of states do not report this information; they only disclose how many ballots were successfully counted. Thad Hall & Daniel Tokaji,
Money for Data: Funding the Oldest Unfunded Mandate, ELECTION LAW @
MORITZ, June 5, 2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2007/06/moneyfor-data-funding-oldest-unfunded.html.
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things like direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines
and residual vote rates that voters have no yardstick for judging. Similarly, when reformers manage to get policymakers’ attention, they lack the information they need to make a credible
case for change. Reformers work hard to overcome these obstacles, but most ask policymakers to ignore their self-interest
and do the right thing. It is little wonder that reform has not
yet gotten much traction.
4. Bureaucrats’ lack of resources
Finally, the people who represent the other main leverage
point for reform—bureaucrats—are similarly handicapped in
their efforts to improve our election system. The bureaucrats
who run our system lack adequate training, funding, and staff.
It is hard for local administrators to perform basic election
functions, let alone spend time on activities that would improve
the system, like collecting performance data or studying best
practices. Moreover, election administrators’ pleas for more
funds often fall on deaf ears, as politicians would much prefer
to fund projects that are visible to voters.
Even when reform is not costly, the tide of local competition runs against change. The financial capital of states and localities is limited, but so is their political capital. There are only so many issues that can make it on the agenda of top-level
policymakers. Governors, legislators, even secretaries of state
must pick and choose what issues will occupy their time. If voters do not pay much attention to a question, the odds are that
state and local officials will not either.
Localism also makes it harder to create professional norms
that would push election officials to do better. It is not just that
local administrators barely have the time and resources to do
their jobs, let alone travel to conferences or study up on best
practices. Localism means that professional associations are
organized at the state level, thus preventing the type of crossstate interactions that help good ideas spread.
B. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: THE DEMOCRACY INDEX
In my forthcoming book,7 I propose a “here to there” solution for addressing these problems: a “Democracy Index,” which
would rank states and localities based on how well their elec7. HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009).
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tion system performs. The Index would function as the rough
equivalent of the U.S. News and World Report rankings for colleges and graduate schools. It would focus on issues that matter to all voters: How long did you spend in line? How many
ballots were discarded? How often did voting machines break
down? The Index would not only tell voters whether things are
working in their own state, but how their state compares to its
neighbors.
The Democracy Index would include nuts-and-bolts metrics
(the length of lines, the number of ballots discarded) rather
than broader measures of a state’s democratic health (campaign finance laws, the robustness of political debate, or the
level of electoral competition). It would be organized around
three simple, intuitive categories that reflect the experiences of
voters and mirror the cyclical rhythms of the administrator’s
job: (1) registering voters, (2) casting ballots, and (3) counting
votes. In each category, the Index would measure performance
“outputs” (How many errors are in the registration lists? How
long are the lines? How many ballots got discarded?) rather
than policy “inputs” (How good is the registration system? Does
the jurisdiction train its poll workers properly? Are ballots
counted using “best practices”?). In measuring performance, the
Index would rely on hard data over subjective assessments
wherever possible.
The Democracy Index is an information shortcut. It distills
a wide variety of data on election performance into a highly intuitive, accessible form: a ranking. There are dangers associated with such shortcuts, as I discuss briefly in Part IV. In
Part III, however, I will canvas the potential benefits that can
come from creating such a shortcut.
III. SHORTCUTS AND LEVERAGE POINTS
In this Part, I argue that if we focus on the key leverage
points in the reform process—voters, policymakers, and election administrators—there is good reason to believe that a Democracy Index could do a great deal to smooth the path for
change, creating an environment in which bigger and better
reform is possible.
A. VOTERS
Voters are a key leverage point in the reform process. We
would not worry about partisanship or local competition if voters pressured elected officials to do the right thing. Unfortu-
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nately, it is often tough for reform proposals to gain traction
with voters. That might seem strange given that the word “democracy” is invoked with reverence by school children and politicians alike. Everyone is affected by a badly run system. So
why are voters not energized about these issues?8
1. Framing the issue
While voters care about how elections are run, discussions
about reform are largely inaccessible to them. As a robust political science literature has demonstrated, voters need a “frame”
to understand a problem and get behind a solution.9 Unfortunately, election administration problems are hard to frame for
voters in a manner that demonstrates their relevance. The discussion either takes place at such a high level of generality that
8. Public-choice scholars would not be surprised that an issue that affects everyone is not at the forefront of the political agenda. Oddly enough,
minority groups—sometimes condemned as “special interests”—are often the
ones that succeed best in a majoritarian system like our own. See, e.g., Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). Political scientist Robert Dahl famously claimed that “minorities rule” in the United
States; coalitions of organized interest groups join together to form majorities
and get legislation passed. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 133 (1956). Or, as Jesse Jackson put it, “in politics, an organized minority is a political majority.” CNN: Both Sides with Jesse Jackson, (CNN television broadcast Jan. 30, 2000). What matters in a system where “minorities
rule” is the ability to organize—to turn out the vote, lobby representatives,
and raise money. And it is often easier to organize a small, easily identified
group with a concrete complaint than it is to get a large majority affected by a
diffuse harm to coalesce. The public-choice explanation is not, of course, a
complete answer. Other problems that impose diffuse harms are salient to
voters—and thus to politicians. Politicians are careful to sketch out positions
on issues like the environment or foreign policy. Moreover, politicians are notoriously risk-averse; no politician is going to be wildly enthusiastic about
flouting the preferences of the majority even when no special-interest group is
there to fight about it.
9. Building on the work of Erving Goffman, see ERVING GOFFMAN,
FRAME ANALYSIS, AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974),
social scientists have extensively analyzed the ways that issues are presented
to, and affect the behavior of, voters. For a sampling of this literature, see, for
example, FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER,
NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION (1987); WILLIAM
H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986); DEBORAH A. STONE,
POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON (1988); Dennis Chong & James N.
Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007); James N.
Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671 (2004); Deborah A.
Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q.
281 (1989).
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people have no sense of what ought to be done, or it descends
into a sea of incomprehensible detail that would try the patience of even the wonkiest voter.
When reformers make their pitch, they often speak in stirring terms, invoking democracy, the dignity of the ballot, the
right to vote. You can practically hear the National Anthem
playing in the background. This is all well and good, but the
National Anthem does not give a citizen much to go on. Moreover, everyone can play the patriotism game; election officials
can also claim the moral high ground and accuse the other side
of neglecting fundamental principles. As any parent knows, it
is hard to resolve an argument whose basic rhetorical structure
is some variant of “am not, are too.”
Things are little better when reformers and election officials swoop from these lofty heights to what election scholars
call “the weeds.” Reformers “have to talk mostly in generalities,” claims Jonah Goldman of the National Campaign for Fair
Elections, because the underlying policy debates seem so
“dull.”10 The subject matter is arcane. Fights often involve intricate debates about counting ballots, jargon-filled discussions
of election machinery, and disputes about nitty-gritty registration requirements. Even election junkies rarely have the stomach for it.
More importantly, these are debates that voters have no
yardstick for judging. Reformers point to a problem—an inadequate registration system, outdated machinery, a poor system
for training poll workers—and argue that the state can do “better.” Election officials respond by talking about regulations issued, resources allocated, and staff trained. Reformers talk
about discarded ballots or unregistered voters. Election officials
assure us these numbers are normal.
For voters, these debates are reminiscent of that famous
Far Side cartoon about what dogs hear. The clueless owner
prattles away to his pet, and all the dog hears is “____, ____,
____, Ginger. ____, ____, Ginger, ____.”11 So what do voters hear
when reformers and administrators go at it? A stream of technical details, occasionally punctuated with grand terms like
“the right to vote” or “democracy.”

10. Interview with Jonah Goldman, Dir., Nat'l Campaign for Fair Elections (Jan. 4, 2008) (on file with the author).
11. Gary Larson, The Far Side, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1983, at 51.
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Voters are not stupid.12 But no one is born with a strongly
held intuition about whether optical scan systems are a good
idea, or whether provisional ballots should be counted only if
they are cast in the correct precinct. Voters need a guide to help
them figure out who is right.
The Democracy Index could help change these dynamics by
giving voters a yardstick to judge these fights. First, it gives
voters the right information. Rather than bogging voters down
in technical details about how the ideal system would be run or
making vague assertions that we could do “better,” reformers
could give voters information on something they can evaluate:
bottom-line results.
Second, the Democracy Index presents the information in
the right form by distilling the data into a highly intuitive, accessible format: a ranking. Voters do not need to wade through
reams of data in order to assess how things are working. The
Index, in effect, gives them a shortcut for making that judgment. Moreover, because the Index grades election systems “on
a curve”—measuring them against one another instead of some
ideal standard—voters can feel confident that they are rewarding those who have succeeded while holding those on the bottom rung to a realistic standard of performance.
2. Jumpstarting grassroots organizing
The most optimistic hope for the Index is that it will encourage voters to get more engaged with grassroots activities.
It is not surprising that voters have been passive about election
reform until now. Current debates put voters in a situation
where they have nothing to contribute. Everyone can invoke
the same vague generalities about the right to vote. But if voters are going to talk about policy, they would have to master a
daunting set of minutiae. Otherwise, even if the average voter
had some impulse to write her representative or call a radio
talk show or organize a petition drive, she would find she had
nothing to say.

12. Many scholars argue, with some evidence, that voters cast their ballots in an irrational fashion. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007). Arguments like these often underestimate the useful
role that heuristics can play in guiding voting behavior. See, e.g., David
Schleicher, Irrational Voters, Rational Voting, 7 ELECTION. L.J. 149 (2008)
(reviewing CAPLAN, supra).
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Ranking systems are useful because, as Dan Esty observes,
they “democratize who can render an opinion.”13 (Whether you
think the opinion is properly informed is a different question,
explored in Part IV). Everyone can express a view on whether
his state ought to be ranked higher than forty-fifth on the Democracy Index. By giving voters an issue they can wrap their
hands around, it may be possible to get voters exercised about
election reform. After all, the rare instances in which voters
have gotten engaged with grassroots organizing—issues like
paper trails or voter ID—have all involved issues that appeal to
people’s intuitions.
The Democracy Index would also expand the grassroots organizer’s time frame. In a world without data, people only get
riled up about reform when there is a crisis. Once a winner is
picked, the media coverage that keeps voters engaged ends abruptly. Reformers thus have a very short time to organize a
coalition for change. An Index, however, ensures that the
reform remains salient long after a crisis (and even in its absence). A ranking creates a durable reminder that a problem
exists. By expanding the organizer’s time horizon, the Index
may help build support for change over the long haul.
3. Giving voters an information shortcut
Even if the Democracy Index does not spawn new grassroots organizing, it should at least help voters do something
that they already do: cast a vote. The great advantage of ranking systems is that they offer voters information shortcuts for
holding elected officials accountable for their missteps. Creating a new shorthand for voters ought to affect the political incentives that currently run against reform.
For those who bristle at the idea of voters’ using shorthand
to evaluate the way our elections are run, it is worth pointing
out that voters will inevitably use some sort of shorthand in
casting a ballot. In most cases, party labels serve as a heuristic
for voters choosing a candidate.14 The label “Democrat” or “Re13. Interview with Dan Esty, Hillhouse Professor of Envtl. Law and Policy, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Conn. (Oct. 24, 2007) (on file with the author).
14. For early work in what is now a vast literature, see, for example,
JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995); BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A
STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1954); ANGUS
CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); V.O. Key, Jr. & Frank Munger, Social Determinism and Electoral Decisions: The Case of Indiana, in
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publican” functions like a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.” It tells the voter that the candidate in question subscribes
to a set of values or policy preferences that are close enough to
the voter’s to choose him.15 As several scholars have explained,
if a voter “knows the big thing about the parties, he does not
need to know all the little things.”16
Political scientists have devoted a lot of energy to making
party cues function more effectively for a simple reason: they
are a good deal better than the other types of shorthand voters
might use.17 Without the party heuristic, voters would be more
likely to base their votes on something unappetizing, such as a
candidate’s race or gender. Or they might cast ballots randomly
so that voter preferences are disconnected from electoral outcomes. The basic defense of party labels is not that they are
perfect—far from it—but that they are the best thing we have
got. If you ask a political scientist whether it is a good idea for
voters to rely on party cues, the likely response will be a sarcastic “as opposed to what?”
If we think about the “as opposed to what” question here, a
ranking system looks a good deal more appealing. Think about
the proxies voters are likely to use today in casting their vote
for election officials. The best bets seem to be (1) anecdotal evidence, (2) news about a widely reported crisis, or (3) partisan
cues. For all its potential shortcomings, a ranking system is superior to each of these alternatives.
Anecdotal evidence is, of course, just that. A glitch here
and there is not good evidence of a full-fledged problem. A
ranking system, in contrast, focuses voters on the bigger picAMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR 281 (Eugene Brudick & Arthur J. Brodbeck eds.,
1959).
15. See, e.g., Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 585, 590 (1997); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994); Arthur Lupia, Dumber than Chimps?
An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE
BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66 (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds.,
2001); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER (2d ed. 1994).
16. BERELSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 321.
17. Indeed, a major movement within political science insists that we
need strong, cohesive parties in order to give voters a better predictive cue as
to how candidates will vote. Better party cues, the argument goes, means
greater accountability. This notion of “responsible party government” was first
endorsed by the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties in 1950. See Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible
Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. (Supp. 1950).
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ture, directing their attention to systemic concerns instead of
the modest anomalies that can afflict even well run systems. It
also directs their attention to the good as well as the bad and
the ugly, revealing which states and localities have done an especially impressive job of running elections.
Even evidence of a crisis may not be a useful guide for voters. While the worst-run systems are more vulnerable to a crisis, not all badly run systems will experience a crisis. Indeed,
given the dearth of the data, we cannot definitively rule out the
possibility that recent brouhahas (Florida 2000, Ohio 2004)
have happened in relatively well-run systems, places that just
happened to be in the path of a turnout tsunami. Crisis-based
voting also has the flavor of closing the barn door after the
horse has been stolen. Voters need a tool that will help them
prevent crises rather than merely react to them.
Finally, partisan cues do not provide a dependable heuristic for voters in the context of election reform. A party label can
tell a voter whether a candidate is liberal or conservative and
thus indicate to a voter how a candidate is likely to approach
issues like campaign finance or felon disenfranchisement. But
in choosing an election administrator, voters need shorthand
for evaluating professionalism and performance, and the party
cue does not help. Democrats and Republicans are equally susceptible to running elections badly.
For all of these reasons, the Democracy Index has the potential to provide voters with a much needed shorthand for
casting a vote. By conveying information about the “big thing”
in election administration—a rough sense of how well the system performs overall—it enables voters to make sensible decisions without knowing all of “the little things” buried in the data.
If the Democracy Index provides voters with a useable
shorthand, it ought to generate a new political dynamic in the
reform environment. The current system offers politicians and
local officials few reasons to pay attention to reform issues. The
Index may give political actors more incentives to pay attention
to how elections are run if votes start to turn on performance.
4. Realigning partisan incentives
Consider, for instance, the fate of Ohio’s Secretary of State,
Kenneth Blackwell, whose travails as Secretary of State are
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well known.18 In 2006, Blackwell ran for governor. Imagine if
Ted Strickland, the Democrat running against him, could have
shown that Ohio was one of the worst-run election systems in
the country. Surely Strickland would have trumpeted those results whenever he could. You can also be sure that secretaries
of state across the country would take notice of that campaign.
An Index would also be invoked by election officials whose
systems rank high. Candidates are always on the hunt for
something to distinguish them from their opponents, some
“Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” to attract voters’ attention. We see lots of examples of this type of self-promotion with
other rankings. For instance, the latest release of the Government Performance Project, which grades state management
practices, prompted immediate press releases by the governors
of the top-ranked states.19
The Index will not only matter during the campaign season. It is also likely to be used in any recount battle. Parties
wage recount wars on two fronts. In court, the parties’ job is to
get their ballots counted and their opponents’ excluded.20 Any
lawyer worth her salt will try to introduce the Index into evidence if it helps her case.
Parties also battle in the arena of public opinion, trying to
enlist voters in their effort to win the legal battle and score political points. And it is hard to imagine that neither party
would invoke the Democracy Index in framing the recount debate for public consumption. After all, if the state ranked low, it
would provide further evidence that the party in power failed to
do its job properly. Conversely, if the state generally scored
high on the Index, the party in power could use it as a shield
against the accusations being levied by its opponents.
Should the Democracy Index be deployed in either context,
it ought to help raise public awareness about the need for
18. For a summary of Blackwell’s travails, see GERKEN, supra note 7, at
ch. 3.
19. News Release, Office of Governor Christine Gregoire, Washington
Earns Top Rating for Managing Public Resources (Mar. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressrelease=804&newsType
=1; News Release, Office of Governor Timothy M. Kaine, Virginia Gets Top
Grade in Performance (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.governor
.virginia.gov/mediarelations/newsreleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=621.
20. For example, see the Coleman versus Franken Minnesota 2008 election Senate recount and following court action. See generally Dave Orrick and
Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Franken’s Lead Increases to 312 Over Coleman in
Minnesota U.S. Senate Race, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Apr. 7, 2009.
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reform and create incentives for politicians to get behind it. If
there is any lesson to be drawn from successful efforts at election reform in other countries, it is that the most effective proponent of reform is usually the opposing party. When the party
out of power has a weapon—an advisory commission report, a
judicial ruling, a ranking system—it will use it to beat on the
other party at every opportunity. It is ugly, but effective.
Even setting aside political races and recount wars, one
can imagine other ways in which the Index might be used as a
sword or shield in partisan politics. For instance, election officials at the bottom of the list might be vulnerable to targeted
fundraising or get-out-the-vote organizing by political blogs like
DailyKos21 or RedState.22 Similarly, any politician dissatisfied
with an election rule would surely invoke the Index. The Index,
after all, makes an instance of special pleading look like a defense of the public interest.
For all of these reasons, the Democracy Index should hang
like a sword of Damocles over politicians, a notoriously riskaverse group. While it will not be salient in every race, it
should matter in some. That would mean that at least some of
the time, the fate of elections officials would hinge in part on
their professional performance, not just their party standing.
Instead of asking an election official to stop thinking about her
political interests in administering the election process, the
Democracy Index links her political fate to her professional performance.
5. Will party heuristics trump?
A skeptic might still insist that the party heuristic—
whether someone has an “R” or “D” by her name—is all that
really matters for low-salience campaigns like races for the secretary of state.23 The worry is that party labels will drown out
any competing information about candidates except during
well-publicized campaigns for higher office, like Kenneth
Blackwell’s gubernatorial campaign. But even if partisan heuristics generally trump all else, a low ranking can still affect a
candidate’s political fate. To begin, the Index ought to matter
when the party heuristic is unavailable—during the primary,
21. Daily Kos: State of the Nation, http://www.dailykos.com (last visited
Apr. 14, 2009).
22. Redstate, http://www.redstate.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
23. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in
City Council Elections? The Role of Election Law, 14 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007).
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when candidates compete against members of their own party,
or during the general election in a nonpartisan race. In these
low-information races, voters do not have a party label to sort
candidates, so any means of distinguishing one candidate from
another is potentially important. Indeed, not only should the
Index itself provide a heuristic for voters, but it should also affect which organizations and newspapers endorse the candidate, thus influencing another basis on which voters cast their
ballots.
Further, even in races where the party heuristic matters,
the Index may affect the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that
determines which candidates get nominated. Party elites play
an important role in the candidate selection process. During
this “invisible primary,” their decisions about funding and endorsements can determine who ends up running and winning
the party primary.24 Imagine that you were a party leader, major donor, or get-out-the-vote organizer. There are a large number of candidates competing for your support. Why would you
back someone whose ranking has rendered him potentially
damaged goods? And would not a high ranking increase a candidate’s standing in your eyes? Even if the ranking will matter
only rarely, a risk-averse political operative will prefer to place
a bet on someone without any handicaps. These behind-thescenes decisions all matter to a candidate’s political fate, and
they all increase the likelihood that politicians will care about
how their state or locality ranks on the Index.
6. Realigning local incentives
As noted in Part I, partisanship is not the only reason our
election system does not function as well as it should. Even
when politics are working correctly—when politicians are attentive to what voters want—political incentives run against
election reform. Local officials compete only on issues that voters can see. When a problem is invisible, a race to the bottom
ensues.
A ranking system not only makes the problems in our election system visible to voters, but it casts those issues in explicitly competitive terms. By ranking states and localities against
one another, the Democracy Index should help shame local officials into doing the right thing.
24. Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91
IOWA L. REV. 131, 151 (2005).
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Consider, for instance, the competition that seems to have
been spurred by one of the rare comparative metrics we have in
election administration: the residual vote rate. In the wake of
the 2000 election, reformers and political scientists used the residual vote rate as a rough proxy for assessing how many votes
had been lost to machine problems, bad ballot design, and the
like. As a CalTech/MIT study observes, when jurisdictions
“were told they had high residual rates in 2000,” many “worked
to cut them to a fraction of what they were by 2002,”25 even before Congress provided funding for new machines. Georgia, for
example, had a high residual vote rate of 3.2% in 2000 but reduced it to 0.9% by 2002.26 Reformers continue to rely on the
residual vote rate to pressure localities to do better. A recent
Brennan Center report, for instance, argues that residual vote
rates should not be higher than one percent.27
We see a similar effect with other ranking systems. Take
the Government Performance Project (GPP), sponsored by the
Pew Center on the States, which grades states based on their
management practices.28 The GPP has had a remarkable
amount of success pushing states to do better on the management front. For instance, its emphasis “on the importance of
workforce planning appeared to be central to enormous advances in the area,” says Richard Greene, who has played a major role in its implementation.29 While half of the states did
such planning in 2005, forty-one did so by 2008.30
You can also see the GPP’s effects on individual states. In
Georgia, for instance, the governor made the state’s low ranking a central platform of change. The state began to measure
25. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECH. PROJECT, INSURING THE INTEGRITY OF
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSISTENT AND COMPLETE REPORTING OF ELECTION DATA 2 (2004), available at http://vote.caltech

.edu/drupal/files/report/insuring_integrity_of_electoral_process.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Brennan Center Report
Finds New Improvements in New Voting Technology Being Implemented in
Several States (Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/brennan_center_report_finds_improvements_in_new_voting_
technology_being_imp.
28. Pew Center on the States: About Us, http://pewcenteronthestates.org/
about.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
29. Interview with Richard Greene, Consultant, Pew Ctr. on the States
(June 12, 2008) (on file with the author). Unless otherwise noted, what follows
in the next two paragraphs is drawn from an interview with Richard Greene.
30. See David S. Broder, Managing: An Affair of States, WASH. POST, Mar.
9, 2008, at B7.
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itself against the GPP’s criteria and has dramatically in a short
time, moving itself from a B to a B+ in three years.31 Similarly,
when the first GPP gave Alabama the lowest grade received by
any state, state officials invited the GPP’s architects to speak to
its leadership and has been “getting steadily better” on all
fronts, says Greene. Greene thinks Alabama’s improvement is
particularly impressive because success “is a moving target,” as
all of the states are improving at the same time.32
A skeptic might worry that local competition matters only
for issues that are important enough for people to “vote with
their feet,” like schools and taxes. But it is a mistake to assume
that people must vote with their feet before local officials will
pay attention. Politicians pay attention to issues even when
they have a captive constituency. They do so for a simple reason. They are risk-averse and would rather represent happy
constituents. Local officials worry not only about latent crises
that might develop, but the cumulative effect of one bad headline after another. They also like to tout their successes, which
is why one often sees high rankings proudly announced on local
and state websites.
The worry about captive constituencies is nonetheless well
taken. It reminds us to recognize the limits of any strategy designed to generate a “race to the top” in election reform. There
are lots of issues competing for voters’ attention, and a ranking
system is not going to push election reform ahead of bread-andbutter issues like jobs and the economy. States will continue to
feel pressure to commit resources to the many other problems
they face. What the Democracy Index does is give election
reform a much-needed boost in this competition for resources.
And that is a good deal better than nothing.
7. Do people care enough about election reform for an Index to
work?
The arguments above depend on a crucial assumption: that
some voters will care about election administration some of the
time. If they do not, giving voters an information shortcut will
not matter much. Indeed, a skeptic might argue that voters will
never care enough about reform to pay attention to a ranking.
After all, it is not hard to imagine why the U.S. News and
31. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT,
GRADING THE STATES: GEORGIA (2005), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/gpp2005 22.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
32. Interview with Richard Greene, supra note 26.
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World Report college rankings are read by so many people—
anyone with a kid applying to college has a personal stake in
knowing how the colleges stack up. But our relationship to election administration is more tenuous and less personal.
Although we cannot know for sure whether a Democracy
Index would have an effect on voters, it would be a mistake to
infer that voter preferences are fixed. Voter opinions tend to be
quite fluid. They are shaped by institutions, the media, and political elites. Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued
that the ability to define a problem and its solution “is the supreme instrument of power,”33 an idea buttressed by a longstanding political science literature on the importance of “framing.”34 Thus, in assessing voter preferences, we must think in
dynamic terms.
There are several reasons to be optimistic about the Index’s
potential. First, other indices have made a splash even though
they do not involve issues that affect people as directly as the
quality of their children’s education. The Environmental Performance Index, for instance, had an effect on environmental
policy well before the the world and his wife became cognizant
of global warming. And the Government Performance Project’s
evaluation of state management systems—a topic that surely
ranks below election reform on the boredom scale—generates
hundreds of news stories whenever it is released. Unless reporters and politicians have an absolutely tin ear on these
questions, that is a sign that something is afoot.
Second, reformers have been able to get traction on election
issues when they frame them effectively. As Jonah Goldman
points out, debates about paper trails have become salient in
large part because reformers came up with a simple metaphor
for capturing the problem: if we can get a receipt from an ATM,
touch-screen vote machines should be able to generate a paper
trail.35 That frame drives some experts crazy because they
think it fundamentally mischaracterizes the problem.36 But it

33. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (1960) (emphasis omitted).
34. See sources cited supra note 9.
35. Interview with Jonah Goldman, supra note 10. For an excellent overview of the role of framing in this debate, see R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E.
HALL, ELECTRONIC ELECTIONS: THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2008).
36. See generally, Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting
and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1807 (2005).
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is certainly driving policymaking,37 confirming physicist G.C.
Lichtenberg’s observation that “a good metaphor is something
even the police should keep an eye on. . . . .”38 If the Index can
provide a similarly intuitive frame for the public, it too ought to
be able to get traction with voters. At the very least, there are
enough stories on election administration controversies these
days that a Democracy Index would surely generate some
press, even if it were only a sidebar to ongoing reporting.
Finally and most importantly, the key difference between
the Democracy Index and many other indices is that the Democracy Index has a ready-made ally that cares deeply about
this information: political parties. As is clear from the preceding discussion, political parties can use the Index for partisan
advantage if they get the word out. Partisan politics—the engine that drives most public debates39—offers a built-in publicity machine for making the Democracy Index salient.
The problem for election reformers in the past is that they
have had a hard time harnessing political competition in the
service of election reform. Though reform issues bubble up during an election crisis, for the most part politicians ignore them.
Without political entrepreneurs to take up the cause, it is hard
to get reform on the agenda. The fact that the Democracy Index
37. See, e.g., Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007
(Holt Bill), H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007).
38. GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG, APHORISMS 79 (R.J. Hollingdale
trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1800–06 and 1844 –53).
39. Political competition represents an important force in shaping public
opinion. As Robert Bennett explains, “American democracy is an extraordinary engine for producing a conversation about public affairs” that ultimately
shapes “the content of public policy decisions . . . .” ROBERT W. BENNETT,
TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2003). The fuel
for that engine is political competition, as political leaders compete against
one another to “shape, coordinate, and frame the public’s understandings
about electoral politics, public policy, and civic affairs.” Michael S. Kang, Race
and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 753 (2008). The literature on
the relationship between political competition and public opinion dates back at
least to the work of venerable political scientists like V.O. Key, Jr. and E.E.
Schattschneider. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE
1936–1960 (1966); SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 33. Scholars often call these
leaders “political entrepreneurs” because of the creative ways in which they
forge new platforms, frame issues, and exploit latent political energies in the
process of building new political coalitions. See, e.g., Kang, supra, at 738 n.17.
For a necessarily incomplete sampling of the seminal work in this area, see,
for example, ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1972); KEY, supra; WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC (Randall L. Calvert et al. eds., 1996); and SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra
note 33.
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turns election reform into a source of political advantage increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs will take up the
cause. When politicians see a potentially useful weapon, they
will fire it.40
B. POLICYMAKERS
The arguments above portray politicians in a rather bad
light—as craven creatures motivated by self-interest. Political
incentives plainly matter to elected officials, and it is important
to be aware of them in thinking about the “here-to-there” problem. But the vast majority of elected officials try to do the right
thing within existing political constraints. We therefore should
not underestimate the appeal of the right answer to politicians.
The appeal of the right answer is another reason that the Democracy Index should get the attention of the top-level officials
who set policy and hold the purse strings. A performance index
is something that appeals to every politician’s inner wonk; it
gives them a much-needed information shortcut to identify
lawmaking priorities and choose among policy options.
1. Giving politicians a baseline
In many ways, the Index serves the same purpose for toplevel policymakers as it does for voters: it gives them a baseline, an information shortcut for refereeing debates between
the election administrators who work for them and the reformers who lobby them. Policymakers see plenty of untrustworthy arguments coming from administrators who are not doing
their jobs properly. Many grow tired of the insistent drum beat
for change emanating from the reform community. Top-level
policymakers have to pick sides, and they do not have time to
work through all the details. They need an information shortcut to guide them.
While top policymakers may be reluctant to hold election
officials accountable based on the necessarily atmospheric
judgments of the reform community, they are likely to be convinced by hard numbers and comparative data. Election administrators can talk all they want about what they have done, but
they cannot get around the stark reality of the ranking: is the

40. One could, of course, make an argument like this about most “latent”
reform platforms that are amenable to effective framing. But few issues are as
closely linked to partisan politics as this one. We are already waging political
battles in which the Index could be used as a partisan weapon.
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system working or not? And why is the state next door doing so
much better?
2. Identifying policy priorities
A ranking provides a useful shorthand in a second way: it
helps flag policymaking priorities. Legislators and governors
are often bombarded with information. They hear lots of complaints, listen to lots of requests for funding, and sift through
lots of reports. What they need is something that helps them to
separate the genuine problems from the run-of-the-mill complaints, a means of distinguishing the signal from the static. A
ranking can perform that role, as it focuses on systemic problems and provides a realistic baseline for judging performance.
Consider, for instance, what occurred in Mexico when the
first version of the Environmental Performance Index (then
called the Environmental Sustainability Index) was released.41
The EPI ranks 149 countries along twenty-five performance indicators. Environmentalists had spent a lot of time trying to
convince Mexico it had a problem. They ended up spending
most of their time addressing low-level bureaucrats. When the
first version of the EPI came out, ranking Mexico in the bottom
fifth of the countries evaluated, it caught the attention of Mexico’s President. The organizations that created the EPI received
dozens of calls and emails from Mexican officials up and down
the political hierarchy, all complaining about Mexico’s ranking
and, eventually, trying to figure out how to fix it. Mexican bureaucrats cared because the President cared.
C. ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS
A final, and often underappreciated, leverage point for
reform is election administrators—the people who do the dayto-day work of running our election system. We usually assume
that pressure for change can only come from the outside—from
voters or reformers or top-level policymakers. But some of the
most effective lobbyists for change are people working inside
the system. Moreover, the long-term health of any bureaucracy
depends heavily on bureaucrats’ policing themselves through
professional norms. The Democracy Index would help on both
fronts. It gives election administrators the information they
need to lobby for much-needed resources. At the same time, the
41. See http://epi.yale.edu/Contents for the rankings and more information on the EPI.
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Index has the potential to promote stronger professional norms
within the field.
To that end, perhaps the most important role an Index
could play with election administrators is to help create a consensus on best practices, as professional norms may ultimately
be more important to a well-run system than pressures from
the outside. Professional norms are what Jerry Mashaw calls
“soft law”42 because they rely on an informal source of power—
peer pressure. They work because government workers are just
like the rest of us. They care what other people think, and they
are likely to care most about the opinions of people in their own
professional tribe.
Anyone who lives with a teenager knows that peer pressure can affect people’s behavior. Social scientists have done
extensive work identifying the ways in which the pressure to
conform affects individual behavior.43 Although peer pressure
is not always a force for good, it can serve useful ends in the
policy-making context. Many professional groups—lawyers, accountants, engineers—possess a set of shared norms about best
practices. While these norms are often informal, they cabin the
range of acceptable behavior. When professional identity becomes intertwined with particular practices, a person’s sense
that he is doing a good job depends on conforming to these
norms. For those of us trying to suppress memories of high
school, it is nice to know that the herd instinct can do a bit of
good in the world.
It is not just peer pressure that causes people to conform to
professional standards; it is also time constraints. No one has
the time to think through the practical and moral considerations involved in every decision they make. Like voters and policymakers, administrators need shorthand to guide their behavior. A professional consensus on best practices can
42. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar.
2005, at 6–7, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&
context=ils.
43. Cass Sunstein, for example, has written about the pressures of conformity upon individuals. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT
(2003). One of the results of conformity is a decision-making “cascade.” Id. at
10–11. If one set of decision makers or “early movers” converge on a particular
option, subsequent decision makers—influenced by the agreement of the first
movers—make the same choice even if they would not have reached such a decision independently. See id. Sunstein also explains both why reasonable
people rely on the decisions of “early movers” and why this tendency sometimes has unfortunate consequences. See id. at 54 –73.
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represent a pretty sensible heuristic for figuring out the right
choice.
Peer pressure not only can shape individual behavior, but
can push institutions to adopt reforms that experts have christened as best practices. Social science research on the “global
polity”44 reveals that despite vast cultural and resource differences among nation-states, countries follow what social scientists call “common models or scripts of what a nation-state
ought to be.”45 Mimicry even happens in areas where you would

44. The global polity “consists of much more than a ‘system of states’ or
‘world economy’ or ‘international system.’ Rather, the global environment is a
sea teaming with a great variety of social units—states and their associated
polities, military alliances, business enterprises, social movements, terrorists,
political activists, nongovernmental organizations . . . .” John Boli, Sovereignty
from a World Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED
RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 53, 59 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001).
For a helpful survey of this literature, see GLOBALIZATION AND ORGANIZATION:
WORLD SOCIETY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (Gili S. Drori et al. eds., 2006);
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325 (1996); John W. Meyer, The World
Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 41
(George M. Thomas et al. eds., 1987); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144 (1997). For a general introduction to the
social science behind the global-polity literature, see W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2001). Ryan Goodman and Derek
Jinks have led the way in connecting this literature to legal scholarship and
exploring its potential ramifications for international law, particularly human
rights law. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Theory of Sovereignty].
45. GILI S. DRORI ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION at ix (2003). For instance, nation-states
often deploy similar record-keeping systems and mandate mass education in
school systems using similar curricula and administrative structures. Isomorphism and decoupling have been found in areas such as “constitutional forms
emphasizing both state power and individual rights, mass schooling systems
organized around a fairly standard curriculum, rationalized economic and demographic record keeping and data systems, antinatalist population control
policies intended to enhance national development,” as well as “formally equalized female status and rights, expanded human rights in general, expansive
environmental policies, development-oriented economic policy, universalistic
welfare systems, standard definitions of disease and health care, and even
some basic demographic variables.” Meyer et al., supra note 44, at 152–53 (citations omitted); see also Karen Bradley & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Polity
and Gender Parity: Women’s Share of Higher Education, 1965-85, 11 RES. IN
SOC. OF EDUC. AND SOCIALIZATION 63 (1996); David John Frank et al., What
Counts as History: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Study of University
Curricula, 44 COMP. EDUC. REV. 29 (2000); John W. Meyer, The Changing Cul-
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think that cultural or economic differences would trump. For
instance, landlocked nations seem to follow global standards
when designing their militaries, leaving them with navies
without ports.46 Similarly, countries where “scientists and engineers comprise less than 0.2% of the population, and research
and development spending is infinitesimal” create “science policy bureaucracies.”47
We similarly see a great deal of imitation by state and local
governments in the United States—instances where the adoption of a policy by a handful of institutions pushes others to
adopt the same policy. At least since the late 1960s,48 social
scientists have documented the ways in which policies spread
from state to state.49 As one of the most recent and comprehentural Content of World Society, in STATE/CULTURE: STATE FORMATION AFTER
(George Steinmetz ed., 1999).
46. See Finnemore, supra note 44, at 336–37. Another example is the fact
that the enrollment of women in institutions of higher education increased
around the world at roughly the same rate and at about the same time in
Western and non-Western countries. See Bradley & Ramirez, supra note 45, at
83–84.
47. Goodman & Jinks, Theory of Sovereignty, supra note 44, at 1760.
48. See, e.g., Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations
Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969).
49. This literature is vast, so what follows is only a sampling drawn primarily from the work of sociologists and political scientists. See, e.g., HENRY R.
GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1992); ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (2007); KAREN MOSSBERGER, THE POLITICS OF IDEAS AND THE SPREAD OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
(2000); RICHARD ROSE, LESSON-DRAWING IN PUBLIC POLICY (1993); Steven J.
Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy Innovations, 29 AM. POL. RES., 221 (2001); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry,
Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 169 (Paul A. Sabatier ed. 1999); Frances Stokes Berry & William
D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History
Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990); Frances Stokes Berry & William
D. Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political Opportunity,
36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715 (1992); Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the
Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738 (1997); Michael Mintrom &
Sandra Vergari, Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of State
Education Reforms, 60 J. POL. 126 (1998); Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram,
Systematically Pinching Ideas: A Comparative Approach to Policy Design, 8 J.
PUB. POL’Y 61 (1988); David L. Weimer, The Current State of Design Craft:
Borrowing, Tinkering, and Problem Solving, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 110 (1993);
Harold Wolman & Ed Page, Policy Transfer Among Local Governments: An
Information-Theory Approach, 15 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., &
INSTITUTIONS 477 (2002). For a critical take on some of this work, see Christopher Z. Mooney, Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion, 54 POL.
RES. Q. 103 (2001) (questioning whether regional effects on diffusion are as
pronounced as prior work has suggested). For an examination of interstate difTHE CULTURAL TURN
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sive studies explains, policy ideas of all sorts—from the adoption of city council-manager systems to crime control policies—
can spread rapidly from “city to city [and] from state to state.”50
Institutions imitate each other for roughly the same kinds
of reasons that individuals do. Sociologists and anthropologists
tend to emphasize peer pressure and social meaning—the ways
in which behavioral “scripts” signal prestige and become the
model for institutional behavior.51 Political scientists, in contrast, tend to emphasize the ways in which time pressures lead
officials to use the decisions of others—particularly their
peers—as a “heuristic” or “shortcut” to guide their behavior.52
Legislators in New York and Pennsylvania, for instance, might
ask not “what would Jesus do,” but “what would Jersey do?”
1. The absence of professional norms in election
administration
Unfortunately, the type of professional norms that could
shape individual and institutional behavior are largely absent
in the elections arena, as are the vehicles for creating and
spreading them. There is no accreditation system or training
program used by election administrators across the country,
nor is there a widely read trade magazine in the field. Although
there are a number of membership groups, most are locally
oriented and do not have a sufficiently large membership to
generate a field-wide consensus.53 These groups also do not
provide as much support and service as other local government
fusion in different countries, see Katerina Linos, How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States? Evidence from Compliance with
European Union Directives, 40 COMP. POL. STUD. 547 (2007); James M. Lutz,
Emulation and Policy Adoptions in the Canadian Provinces, 22 CAN. J. POL.
SCI. 147 (1989); Dale H. Poel, The Diffusion of Legislation Among Canadian
Provinces: A Statistical Analysis, 9 CAN. J. POL. S. 605 (1976); Note, When Do
Policy Innovations Spread?: Lessons for Advocates of Lesson-Drawing, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1467 (2006). For a survey of the literature on diffusion among
non-state organizations, see David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 ANN.
REV. SOC. 265 (1998).
50. KARCH, supra note 49, at 2–3.
51. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
52. See KARCH, supra note 49, at 7–9.
53. A recent survey indicates that sixty percent of local officials did not
belong to a national professional association, and one quarter of local officials
did not belong to any professional association. ERIC A. FISCHER & KEVIN J.
COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ELECTION REFORM AND LOCAL ELECTION
OFFICIALS: RESULTS OF TWO NATIONAL SURVEYS, RL-34363, at 5–6 (2008),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34363_20080207.pdf.
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organizations, like the National Association of Counties or the
National Conference of State Legislatures.54
Most importantly, the membership of these associations is
often quite reluctant to endorse “best practices.” For instance,
one of the rare nationwide associations, the National Association of Secretaries of State, uses the term “shared practices” on
the ground that local variation prevents it from identifying
which practice is best.55 Similarly, Ray Martinez, a former
commissioner of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
the federal agency charged with election administration issues,
notes that whenever the EAC even raises the possibility of
promoting best practices, it receives “pushback.”56 One political
scientist bemoaned the field’s resistance to best practices, noting: “Every time I go to a conference, people tell me ‘that won’t
work where I’m from,’ as if they lived on a different planet.”57
2. Can the Democracy Index help?
The Democracy Index might provide a useful start toward
building professional norms and disseminating good policies. If
we focus on the issues deemed salient to sociologists and anthropologists, the question is whether the Democracy Index could
generate professional peer pressure among election administrators or disseminate a “script” as to what constitutes a well-run
system.
The Democracy Index should at least provide a focal point
for election administrators’ attention. Surely it would be hard
for anyone to resist checking how his state or locality measured
up on the ranking. Administrators would want to peek at the
54. Interview with Trey Grayson, Sec’y of State, Kentucky (Jan. 9, 2008)
(on file with the author); Interview with Jonah Goldman, supra note 10; Interview with Anonymous Election Official (Apr. 15, .2008) (on file with the author). It is worth noting that these organizations lack the resources they need
to provide such broad services to their members. The National Association of
Secretaries of State, for instance, has an extraordinarily small staff and has
accomplished an impressive amount with the staff it possesses. Similarly, the
institution that seems to have made the most headway in promoting professional norms is the Election Center, a Texas-based nonprofit headed up by
Doug Lewis. The Election Center offers training and continuing education to
election administrators while serving as an advocate for their interests. Unfortunately, the Election Center is not yet big enough to reach most election administrators.
55. Interview with Leslie Reynolds, Executive Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Sec’ys of
State (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with the author).
56. Interview with Ray Martinez, Former Comm’r, Election Assistance
Comm’n (Jan. 24, 2008) (on file with the author).
57. Interview with Anonymous (April 15, 2008) (on file with the author).
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Index for the same reason that people “Google” their own
names or give a book a “Washington read” (scanning the index
to see what was said about them). If the Index were welldesigned and created by a credible group, there is good reason
to think that an election administrator’s professional prestige
would be increased by a high ranking, something that would be
quite useful in a world where individuals and rule-making bodies tend to mimic high-status people and institutions.58 The
Index might develop into a professional touchstone for the field.
In addition to generating some professional peer pressure,
the Democracy Index could help disseminate best practices. As
election administrators and political scientists work through
the data, they should be able to identify what policies succeed
and thus help create a set of “scripts” for what a well-run system looks like.
Consider, for example, the role that the GPP has played in
generating and disseminating best practices among government administrators. Why do state administrators pay attention to the GPP? Philip Joyce, one of its architects, argues that
one reason that the GPP is so effective is because it is published by Governing, a trade publication widely read and widely
respected by state administrators.59 Although Governing’s main
audience is administrators, people care about the GPP report.
It may not affect an administrator’s political standing, but it
matters to her professional standing.
Someone might worry that, consistent with the view of the
National Association of Secretaries of State, there is too much
local variation for a set of best practices to emerge within the
field of election administration.60 I am frankly skeptical about
that claim, at least when it is cast in broad terms. It is hard to
imagine that we will not be able to identify some broad policies—funding, training policies, registration systems—that
would be useful across jurisdictions.
Even if it is impossible to create a consensus on model policy inputs, however, it should still be possible to generate professional norms about performance outputs. The Democracy Index could create something akin to a lingua franca in the realm
58. Strang & Soule, supra note 49, at 274 –75; Note, supra note 49, at
1473.
59. Interview with Philip Joyce, Professor of Pub. Policy & Pub. Admin.,
George Washington University (Sept. 19, 2007) (on file with the author).
60. See Interview with Leslie Reynolds, supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
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of election administration, a shared set of performance standards that would apply to localities regardless of their policy
practices. For instance, a professional norm might develop that,
regardless what machine one uses, no machines should exhibit
anything lower than a one percent residual vote rate. The Index might similarly generate a set of performance baselines regarding the number of errors in the registration process or the
number of poll worker complaints that fall within an acceptable
range for a well-run system.
If we focus on the political science work on policy diffusion,
we can similarly identify ways in which the Democracy Index
might help promote best practices among election administrators and institutions. Political scientists think that policy diffusion is most likely to occur when innovations in other states are
visible because policymakers tend to rely on information that is
“timely, available, and salient.”61 One of the reasons that professional associations,62 “policy entrepreneurs,”63 and public interest groups or think tanks64 matter, says Professor Andrew
Karch, is that they “typically provide timelier, more accessible,
and more detailed information about policy innovations” than
other sources of information.65
The Democracy Index could be useful in this regard, because it can help policymakers to identify the policy innovation
needle in a haystack of widely varying practices. It is just the
kind of “information shortcut” that scholars like Karch argue
policymakers need. The Index would give us a pretty good
sense about which states and localities have performed best
and, if it is properly designed, should simultaneously offer information about which policy “inputs” drove that success. If, as
Karch argues, “the most influential causal mechanisms” of the
agenda-setting process are “those that can heighten the visibili-

61. KARCH, supra note 49, at 8. This is, to be sure, not a conclusion
reached only by political scientists. Sociologists Harold Wolman and Ed Page,
for instance, have reached a similar conclusion. Wolman & Page, supra note
49, at 498.
62. KARCH, supra note 49, at 105–43; Balla, supra note 49. For sociology
work exploring similar themes in the context of private institutions, see, for
example, Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation:
Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999); Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990).
63. Mintrom, supra note 49; Mintrom & Vergari, supra note 49.
64. KARCH, supra note 49.
65. Id. at 31.
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ty of a policy innovation,”66 the Index moves at least one step in
the right direction.
Second, the Democracy Index might provide an opportunity
to create a poor man’s substitute for a vibrant professional
network. Imagine, for instance, that the Democracy Index website provided not just the rankings and the underlying performance data, but tables and charts within each category identifying which jurisdictions followed which policies. The website
might also provide links to extant research on the subject, even
examples of implementing legislation and contact information
for jurisdictions that have implemented the policy successfully.
The Index would thus provide a portal that not only identifies
which policies are succeeding, but gives policymakers instant
access to the best available information on how to implement
them. Here again, if the problem for officials is how “to sift
through the massive amount of information that is available to
find what is needed,”67 perhaps a well-designed DemocracyIndex.com site could play a useful role.
There is limited evidence that rankings can promote this
type of contact and information sharing between jurisdictions.
Richard Greene of the Government Performance Project, for instance, says that states that earn a good grade on the GPP are
regularly contacted by other states for more information about
their policies. In Greene’s words, “States are absolutely hungry
for good, solid, well-researched information to help them do
what they do better.”68
The Democracy Index is not a perfect substitute for the
many mechanisms that social scientists have identified for
creating professional norms and diffusing policy innovations—
far from it. But a ranking system does have the potential to
move us a little farther in the right direction.
IV. THE COSTS OF SHORTCUTS
Needless to say, there are real costs to using shortcuts to
jumpstart the reform process, as I detail at length in my forthcoming book.69 For instance, rankings like a Democracy Index
simplify. It is an inevitable consequence of trying “to provide
one answer to a question when that answer depends on several
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Interview with Richard Greene, supra note 29.
GERKEN, supra note 7, chs. 4 & 5.
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bits of data,” in the words of Oxford’s Stein Ringen.70 Distilling
information can serve many useful ends, but any effort to rank
necessarily involves a tradeoff between precision and accessibility, or “rigor and intuition,” to use Dan Esty’s phrase.71
It is a mistake, however, to insist that rankings necessarily
oversimplify, as if any type of shorthand is necessarily illegitimate in the policymaking world. Policymaking would be impossible without shorthand. If all shorthand were eliminated,
we would not have a GDP and thus could not distinguish between an economic blip and a recession. Congress would never
stop holding hearings, because there would always be more testimony to collect. Consumer Reports would go out of business.
Heaven knows what the New York Stock Exchange would do.
Even disaggregated data are a form of shorthand. As Dan
Esty notes, “quantification is about distillation.”72 The raw ingredients of the Democracy Index are stand-ins for a vast and
complicated process that no individual could possibly evaluate
first-hand. The very purpose of data is to distinguish between
what Esty calls “signal” and “noise.”73
Because shorthand is inevitable, the real question is what
kind of shorthand to use. I have offered several reasons to favor
ranking as a form of shorthand. But there are costs that accompany those benefits. The first is that voters will imbue the
results with greater precision and accuracy than they deserve.
The second is that a ranking may provide such a blunt tool for
holding people accountable that it ends up putting pressure on
the wrong people. Secretaries of state, for instance, may be
pushed to do better when the real problem is the absence of
adequate funding, something controlled by legislators or local
commissioners. While these costs can certainly be mitigated,
they cannot be eliminated. For example, the reasons the Democracy Index is likely to succeed are precisely the reasons
that we are wary of indices in the first place: voters may not
look past the ranking itself. The costs associated with ranking
are simply the flip side of its benefits: accessibility, simplicity,
and popular appeal. Given that we cannot make these problems
go away, we ought to be clear-eyed about acknowledging them.
So how do we balance the benefits of accessibility against
the costs of imprecision? While the costs of ranking are serious,
70.
71.
72.
73.

STEIN RINGEN, WHAT DEMOCRACY IS FOR 283 (2007).
Interview with Dan Esty, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.

2009]

SHORTCUTS TO REFORM

1613

in my view the benefits still outweigh them. To begin, even if
voters vest too much faith in an Index, at least they will be
putting their trust in what ought to be a pretty good measure of
democratic performance. The fact that there is not an “objective” answer on these issues does not mean that the Index’s
architects will have a license to engage in free-form engineering. There are answers to these questions, and some answers
will be better than others. If the Index is properly designed,
even those who quibble with a decision should nonetheless
think it was a reasonable one.
On the other side of the equation, there are costs associated with not having a ranking. We come back to the “as opposed to what?” question. A ranking will surely oversimplify
the state of affairs. But, as Ringen observes, “[s]ome information gets lost, but something else is gained.”74 Reams of comparative data cannot give us a clear view of how jurisdictions
are performing overall. As with party labels, rankings tell voters about the “big thing” even if they lose track of the “little
things.” A well-designed Index fares particularly well when
compared to the other shortcuts citizens and policymakers use
in evaluating these questions—anecdote, haphazard evidence of
a crisis, or partisan labels. People place unwarranted faith in
each of these heuristics. Each leads to oversimplification and
errors of a more significant sort than a well-designed Index
will. And not one of them gets us any closer to improving our
failing system. Editorial writer Meg Greenfield once observed
that “[e]verybody is for democracy—in principle. It is only in
practice that the thing gives rise to stiff objections.”75 It is just
the reverse for rankings. It is easy to be against rankings in
principle. It is only in practice that they start to look good.
CONCLUSION
A Democracy Index would provide a better set of decisionmaking shortcuts than we have now. It would give voters a better cue when they cast their vote. It would give policymakers
the shorthand they need to figure out whether a problem exists
and how to fix it. It might even provide a professional touchstone for election administrators, helping identify the kinds of
best practices that professionals have long used as a decisionmaking shortcut.
74. RINGEN, supra note 70, at 284.
75. Meg Greenfield, The People’s Revenge, WASH. POST, June 14, 1978, at
A27.
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In my view, the field has not thought hard enough about
the ways in which shortcuts can help solve the “here to there”
problem in election reform. One can imagine lots of other shortcuts that might serve a useful role. Chris Elmendorf and I have
written about the use of “citizen commissions” in blessing
reform proposals, thus providing a potentially powerful heuristic for voters trying to figure out which proposals to trust.76 Ed
Foley has written about the useful role an “amicus” court could
play in providing a guide to judges struggling to wade through
arcane election rules.77 A model election code might provide a
helpful template for legislators revising election rules, offering
them a set of regulations “blessed” by experts and used in other
states and thus facilitating the diffusion of best practices.
“Shadow” districting commissions might also provide a useful
baseline for judges evaluating the merits of a districting plan.78
These “here to there” strategies do little more than create
shortcuts for decision makers in the reform process. For that
reason, they may seem quite modest. But they are the kind of
modest reforms that can make bigger, better reform possible.
Shortcuts like these beat out most other reform proposals for a
simple reason: they should help make those alternatives possible.

76. See Gerken, Double-Edged Sword, supra note 2; Gerken, Electoral
Reform, supra note 2; Elmendorf & Gerken, supra note 2.
77. Edward B. Foley, A Model Court for Contested Elections (Or the “Field
of Dreams” Approach to Election Law Reform), ELECTION L. @ MORITZ, June
19, 2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=157.
78. See Heather Gerken, Out of the Shadows: Private Redistricting Can
Help Overcome Lawmakers’ Partisanship, LEGAL TIMES, May 5, 2008, at 62.

